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in a Post-Democratic Environment
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Abstract. Political and economic internationalization and globalization, the rise of sub-national 
self-governing regions and spheres, governance replacing government and many related 
processes change the role and context of the nation-state, the protector of mass democracy. The 
concept of (substantive) representation, representation as ‘acting for,’ can help develop answers 
to the threat that this ‘loss of polity’ poses to equal and universal access to decision-making, 
i.e., the ideals behind mass democracy. Examining the reasons why the two most prominent 
conceptions of representation – substantive and descriptive – would be valuable, I argue that 
we can only make an uncontroversial case for substantive representation. I show that currently 
popular cures for ‘loss of polity’ cannot be construed as new versions of or alternatives for mass 
democracy. Finally, I discuss two ideal-types of more reasonable interpretations of the ideals 
behind mass democracy.
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The role and context of the nation-state, the protector of mass democracy, is 
changing - in Europe more so than elsewhere, perhaps, but the phenomenon is becoming 
increasingly common. Processes of political and economic internationalization and 
globalization, as well as the creation of sub-national self-governing regions and spheres 
bind the hands and limit the reach of the state. The replacement of classical hierarchical 
government by egalitarian governance and the replacement of democratic by efficient 
modes of control gnaw at the domain and grip of mass democracy. Th e rise of subpolitics, 
institutionalized deliberative democracy, stakeholder participation and so on also signal 
adaptations of the formal political structure to the evolution of economic and political 
reality, away from sovereign nation-states towards a more fragmented society with unequal 
access to the loci of power. National electorates may still control national parliaments, but 
both now control the terms of social cooperation far less directly, far less exclusively, and 
therefore far less effectively.
Against this background of ‘loss of polity,’ the disappearance of the single, 
unequivocal and all-embracing political community, I argue that one of the defining 
elements of liberal democratic societies, representation, can help us develop viable answers 
to its most important drawbacks, chief among which is the threat to mass democracy, a 
cornerstone of the modern polity.
Mass democracy understood as equal and universal access to decision-making is a 
means to an end, the end being characterized by the idea that “no person is insignificant” 
(Bush 2001). Mass democracy demands representation of all, but representation is a 
complex concept. Focusing on the two most prominent interpretations of representation, 
substantive representation (roughly, the representation of interests and views) and 
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descriptive representation (the representation of sociological traits like gender, colour 
or craft), I discuss the reasons why either one would be valuable. I conclude that we can 
only make an uncontroversial case for substantive representation, only in the context of 
mass democracy, and only in the sense that mass democracy is one possible environment 
in which substantive representation may be feasible. I then argue that currently popular 
cures for ‘loss of polity’ cannot, except with considerable imagination, be construed as 
new versions or vessels of mass democracy. Finally, I discuss two ideal-types of more 
feasible interpretations of the ideals behind mass democracy: adaptations of deliberative 
democracy, and a basically inegalitarian construction I call consultative elitism. Although 
ideal-types, neither one turns out to be really ideal.
I. TH E R ISE A N D FA LL OF M A SS DE MOCR AC Y
“Ein Gespenst geht um in Europa.“ At the dawn of the 20th Century, few foresaw the 
rise of mass democracy. Even fewer would have believed that a political decision-making 
procedure based on a widely dispersed right to elect representatives and be elected as 
a representative could survive until the end of that century. Previous experiments in 
democracy had, after all, not inspired great confidence in the system.
If we look for factors explaining this improbable success story, we shall probably 
find that one idea had very little to do with it: a sudden belief in the universal and equally 
distributed goodness and rationality of all humankind. Other explanations are more 
likely: the extension of the right to vote in response to threats of social disorder, even 
revolution, from the side of those previously excluded; extension of suffrage even as a 
counterrevolutionary act – for instance where conservatives supported the women’s right 
to vote, expecting women to be more pliable than hot-headed socialist working class men. 
More important, two systemic factors are involved: constraints and limits to democracy. 
Democratic decision-making systems operate under a long series of formal and informal 
constraints inhibiting the direct translation of non-reflexive immediate preferences into 
policy: representation rather than direct democracy, selection of ‘fit’ representatives by 
parties, general elections every three to ten years rather than referenda for every single 
issue, constitutional rights, qualified majority constraints on constitutional change, legal 
constraints on anti-constitutional parties, and so on. In addition, there are limits to mass 
democracy – areas where democracy was never introduced, from the choice of the ruling 
coalition to suffrage for the youngest, for (most) non-nationals, for neighbours across the 
state border whose lives are affected by what happens within a country’s borders.
How important each of these factors (or any other) is in explaining the emergence 
and survival of democracy is first of all an empirical question, and secondly - in the present 
context - an irrelevant one. What matters here is that democracy cannot be explained by 
a sudden Kingdom Come faith in universal wisdom, and that there is reason to believe 
that ‘mass democracy’ is more wrapping than gift, more rhetoric than substance. Mass 
democracy appears to be less massive and less democratic than the term suggests. There 
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are, admittedly, many definitions and interpretations of the term democracy, yet all share 
two idea(l)s: those of universal and of equal access to power, thus distinguishing democracy 
from feudalism, tyranny, monarchy, elite and mob rule and the like. If then we compare 
the theory of mass democracy to the practice, there is good reason to be less surprised 
by the rise of democracy. The ideal of equal access to power is realized only once every 
few years during the hours of a general election, the ideal of universal access to power has 
never been fully realized - and as announced above, both ideals are increasingly victims 
of ‘loss of polity.’
‘Loss of polity’ is shorthand - some might say code - for the cumulative effect of a 
series of not necessarily related processes reducing the actual power of the nation-state 
(with power understood simply, perhaps simplistically, as the ability to make another do 
what she would otherwise not do). It is the effect, loss of polity, that is interesting in the 
present context, rather than the causes, but both are worth clarifying. 
As to causes: three types of transformation processes are reducing the state’s role. 
First, there are international processes ‘from above’: cultural and economic globalization 
and migration, but also (partly in response) the increasing number, task and authority 
of international organizations from treaty organizations to judicial institutions, none 
of which existed roughly a century ago, when international cooperation was almost 
by definition limited to promises of non-interference and military assistance against 
interference. While international cooperation increases the power of the collective, self-
binding reduces that of the individual members.
Second, political institutions and authorities emerge alongside, parallel to, nation-
states. This is one of the more popular interpretations of the evolution of the European 
Union, whose ever increasing numbers of directives, permissions and subsidies enter 
the member-states less and less at the national level through national administrative 
institutions, but do so more and more directly at the sub-levels of regions, provinces 
and municipalities. Over the past decade, cooperative ventures of states on both sides 
of the Pacific, in South-America, and in Africa, have budded, with members expressing 
the ambition of developing them in ways similar to the European Union, thereby hoping 
to promote trade and welfare and to increase the price of internal conflict. Finally, the 
continued existence of traditional structures of cooperation and authority in places where 
the nation-state never really took hold (Africa, the Arabic world, parts of Asia) can also be 
construed as a parallel drains on the power such states could at least theoretically have.
Note that the states left relatively unaffected by parallel and international power 
drains are the (would-be) superpowers or hegemons that can afford limited cooperation. 
The third and final process affects even some of these states: the internal redistribution of 
power. An obvious example is the creation of sub-national (border-crossing or internal) 
self-governing regions, usually with an ethnic, religious or cultural character - a process 
that may sometimes prevent secession and keep a state together, at least in name. More 
recent is the evolution of cooperative structures of relatively consensual, egalitarian 
governance, structures in which “private parties” like NGOs, enterprises participate as 
Substantive Representation in a Post-Democratic Environment118
more or less equal partners alongside the representatives of the state - sometimes even 
regional or local governments participate as equal partners of central authorities. Other 
examples of the internal redistribution of power include the replacement of democratic 
by efficient modes of control (Jun and Blühdorn 2006), the rise of subpolitics (pace 
Beck 1997), institutionalized deliberative democracy or stakeholder participation. All of 
these bind the hands and limit the reach of the state and signal an adaptation of formal 
political structures to the evolution of economic and political reality, away from sovereign 
nation-states towards a more fragmented society with unequal access to the loci of power 
(Wissenburg 2008). And there’s the rub.
These three processes not only affect the power of the state as a set of administrative 
and executive central institutions, they also change the character of the state as a polity, 
i.e., as uniting all members of society and all their cooperative ventures inside one 
arena where either social intercourse is directly coordinated or from which authority is 
delegated to distinct social spheres. It would be an exaggeration to say that any one state 
(short of a totalitarian regime) ever approached this kind of perfection - but it is clear that 
the processes sketched move societies further away from it: they result in fragmenting 
responsibility for policies and states of affairs over numerous, often anonymous and 
opaque institutions, in hiding or deleting points of access to control and decision making, 
and in the splitting or even fragmenting of citizens’ loyalties and identities (which might 
help to explain the rise of reactionary populist movements in Europe and the former 
USSR). It is these results that I refer to as ‘loss of polity.’
Since the state is not only the ultimate protector and definer of mass democracy, but 
also its object, loss of polity undermines the import and relevance of mass democracy. 
While electorates still control parliaments, parliaments’ control over the terms of social 
cooperation is diminished: it is far less direct, far less exclusive, and therefore far less 
effective.
There is reason to deplore this development. Democracy as equal access to power 
is, for one, the rule rather than the exception in a non-normative, logical sense: to count 
as rational, it is the deviation from equality, for instance the deviation from equal access 
to power, that requires a defence, i.e., proof that relevant differences between individuals 
exist. Democracy is, in addition, closely connected to the classic, even ancient Stoic, 
Christian and liberal half-normative, half-positive ideal of fundamental human equality 
and our equally distributed potential for reason. Finally, democracy is linked to basic moral 
values like responsibility and accountability. Contrary to overoptimistic rational choice 
analyses, we can hope but not expect that no one ever suffer from social cooperation, and 
hope but not expect mutual advantage in every individual exchange and project - but we 
can believe that no one deserves not to have a say in what touches his or her life, that no 
one deserves to be unheard or to be sacrificed or injured without proper explanation. 
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II. TH E COM PLE X CONCEPT OF R EPR ESEN TATION
We owe to Hannah Pitkin a standardized language of (political) representation. In 
her seminal The concept of representation (1967), she first of all pointed to the surprisingly 
close connections between political representation and other forms of representation 
(in law, literature, art, thought, etc.). To avoid confusion, I shall from now on use the 
term representation to refer to political representation only, unless explicitly indicated 
otherwise.
From the point of view of political scientists and theorists, Pitkin’s most important 
contribution is her description of three conceptions of the concept of representation: 
descriptive representation as ‘standing for,' symbolic representation as ‘standing for,' and 
representation as ‘acting for’ – which I shall call "active" or "substantive representation."1 
The basic distinction is that between standing for and acting for: in the first sense, the 
representative physically ‘reflects’ the represented; in the second sense, representation 
is reflection of ideas instead. The further distinction between symbolic and descriptive 
representation is based on what the representative (flag, king or MP) stands for: the 
represented itself, or information about the represented (Pitkin 1967, 99) – the ‘meaning’ 
of that which is represented.
One might say that Pitkin also introduces a fourth conception of representation 
when she argues for an understanding of active representation as acting in the best interest 
of the represented (‘representation of interests,’ substantive representation), rather than on 
the direct preferences of the represented (representation of preferences) – although Pitkin 
herself thinks of this distinction as one between a valid and a non-valid interpretation of 
the concept.
In addition to her taxonomical contribution, Pitkin offers at least two other important 
ideas of a more normative nature. First, there is the argument just referred to in favour 
of substantive representation and against that of preferences. Pitkin sees this distinction 
as more fruitful and realistic than the classic free/constrained agent scale (or mandate/
independency controversy; cf. Pitkin 1967,144). Here the constrained agent is a mere 
delegate, the arm of the represented, his actions owned by the represented, his behaviour 
governed by the represented, in sum, a mere extension of the represented, whereas the free 
agent, at the other extreme of the scale, is as fully autonomous as possible – think of the 
guardian of a severely mentally handicapped person. In the end, she argues, the question 
is not which type of agent is the ‘best’ representative (i.e., what is the best interpretation 
of representation) but rather what it is that should be represented. The free/constrained 
agent dichotomy tends to obscure that there are, in fact, two issues at stake, not one: there 
is the question of the meaning of the concept of representation, and there is fleshing out 
a particular conception. Pitkin does the latter by arguing that representation, as making 
1] I use the terms conception and concept, in line with Rawls (1973) and Gray (1980), in a relatively 
stringent way: conceptions are logically consistent interpretations of an overarching concept.
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present what is somehow not present (cf. Pitkin 1967, 92 ff.), is only taken seriously when 
the representative understands and respects the represented as a human being endowed 
with moral capacities, reason and so forth. Only then can the representative be truly 
responsive, truly in discourse with the represented and his or her claims.
Secondly, Pitkin offers a forceful argument in favour of active representation as the 
politically most important (normatively best) conception of the concept. While admitting 
the relative merits of descriptive and symbolic representation, she maintains that it is active 
representation that catches the deeper meaning of representation. Ultimately, disputes 
about the non-representativeness of a legislature relate not to the legislature as a symbol, 
nor to its composition in terms of sex, age, colour or creed – but to ‘non-response,’ to the 
voice of the represented remaining unheard: to their interests and ideas being excluded. 
Note one possible implication of this perfectionist line of thought: since it is substantive 
exclusion that matters, not formal exclusion, the actual degree to which (for instance) a 
legislature reflects the composition of the electorate is in itself irrelevant to any question 
of good representation. Even a plea to limit the class of potential representatives (e.g. to 
adults, adult males, wise old men, anyone with a university degree, the nobility) can be 
consistent with good (substantive) representation.
Over the course of the years, both Pitkin’s categorization and her normative theses 
have been the subject of deserved critique. Her three or four conceptions of representation, 
for one, are less clearly distinct than they appear to be. For instance, the conceptions of 
descriptive and symbolic representation only seem to make sense against the background 
of the third, active representation. Consider the political symbol of symbols: a flag 
hanging in a legislature. Contrary to Pitkin, one could argue that a flag either does or does 
not carry information: it either sends out a call for unity, a message of shared culture and 
history – or it just hangs there. In the first case, it reflects the composition of a country, 
it perhaps even represents substantive ideas (shared values and interests); in the second 
case, it just hangs there as a piece of colourful cloth hiding an ugly stain on the wall but 
not making something present that is not somehow present. Or, from another direction, 
one could argue that Pitkin introduced descriptive representation as a kind of straw man, 
merely to be aimed at and shot down in the end as being a confused mix of two more really 
distinct ideas – symbolic and active representation.
As for Pitkin’s normative theses, since the sheer amount of literature on political 
representation makes an adequate overview of the critique impossible, I shall limit 
myself to three (presently) interesting lines of comment. I shall not, for instance, discuss 
objections from the side of empirical political science, to the effect that Pitkin’s categories 
are virtually impossible to operationalize and therefore of little help to empirical research 
into the quality of democracy. Perhaps this says more about the theoretical relevancy of 
empirical political science than the other way around.
First, there is George Kateb’s (1981) discussion of direct versus representative 
democracy, where he argues that to construe these two as opposites, as if only direct 
democracy is truly representative and representative democracy basically exclusive, 
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is to misconstrue representation. The real opposites are representation and exclusion. 
In a representative democracy, the represented are not excluded – but, to use Pitkin’s 
phrase once more, made present where they are not present – in fact, cannot be present: 
modern democracies are often too large to let the whole electorate gather under a tree. 
Direct democracy is just one mode and method of representation among others – the real 
question is which of these methods can best reflect what truly matters about people: their 
mere presence, or their ideas.
Secondly, and predictably, a large number of theorists have pointed out that Pitkin 
too easily, too optimistically, discards descriptive representation. Protest by groups that 
feel excluded (i.e., non-represented), like pensioners who see their pension decrease year 
after year, or disabled who feel persecuted by social security agencies, may signal ‘bad’ 
representation yet cannot be seen as arguments against the possibility of adequate active 
representation. But there is more.
For one, as Anne Phillips (1995) for instance argued, the constant and systematic 
exclusion of one group from among the representatives (people of colour, persons of 
the other gender) may justify protest even when the represented would be meticulously 
precise and sincere in representing, even championing, the interests of the excluded. 
Exclusion from representative functions – whether formal or informal – signals exclusion 
from full membership of the community: it is like, or perhaps is, being classified among 
the infants, the insane, the feeble-minded, cattle and other ‘things’ that apparently cannot 
speak for themselves. 
A further reason to distrust Pitkin’s dismissal of descriptive representation is that 
the chosen few may not even be capable of representing the excluded, simply because they 
do not live their lives, do not share their experiences, do not know their perspective on life: 
as the song goes, ‘it’s different for girls.’ Although this argument is dangerous (it’s different 
for everyone, whatever ‘it’ may be), it is not without merit.
Finally, the most obvious comment of all: Pitkin’s model has too few dimensions. 
She recognizes the mandate-independency dilemma, although translated into terms 
of the best interpretation of substantive representation, but she silently passes over e.g. 
the problems involved in representing diverging opinions of different individuals on 
separate subjects, or those in representing one’s own voters versus the interests of a nation, 
platform, ideology or party. Moreover, Pitkin’s interpretation of representation remains 
coloured by its background: mass democracy. She offers no analysis as to who is, or should 
be, or can be, represented – a question that may make all the difference in the world for the 
substance of substantive representation.
Returning to the question of alternatives to mass democracy that still represent all 
and deny no one’s significance, we face a problem, viz., the absence of one unique clear-cut 
criterion of good representation, even if we throw out symbolic representation – by many 
considered to be a red herring in the school of conceptions of representation. We have a 
choice to make between (further) conceptual reductionism and pluralism. The first comes 
down to claiming that there can either be only one correct interpretation (conception) 
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of the concept of representation (monism) or that where two conceptions contradict 
one another, at least one or even both must be false. Note that this does not necessarily 
imply realism or neoplatonic idealism; the claim is epistemological not ontological. The 
alternative is pluralism: two or more conceptions may contradict one another without 
any of them necessarily being wrong. On this view, the overarching concept is called 
‘complex.’ Representation is such a complex concept – its different conceptions can all be 
valid interpretations of the concept.
Let me illustrate the complexity of representation with an example derived from 
Temkin’s analysis of the complex concept of equality (Temkin 1993). Imagine God and 
the devil discussing Job’s faith. Rather than testing one Job, God suggests three Jobs 
for a fair test: Job1, Job2 and Job3. Job1 is miserable all through his eight decades of life: 
physically handicapped, covered with swears and dirt, dressed in rags, and generally 
unattractive. Job2 is doubly miserable during the first half of his life (more handicapped, 
more dirty, poor, unattractive etc.) but has a life of bliss for the remaining forty years. Job3 
is the reverse image of Job2: blissful until he hits forty, then twice as miserable as Job1. 
Job1 is a socialist, as is Job2 until he is cured; Job3 is irreversibly liberal. Job2 and Job3 are 
politicians, Job1 an ordinary voter. Jobland being a three-person state with a one-person 
parliament, Job1’s vote is crucial for the Sanhedrin elections. For a long time, Job1 votes 
for Job2 – that is, until liberalism takes over Job2’s body and he no longer voices Job1’s 
concerns. At that moment, Job1 changes his vote and elects Job3 to the Sanhedrin: Job3 
may be a liberal, but is at least someone with whom Job1 can identify – and hope that, 
being new to being cursed, Job3 will at least understand Job1’s plight which Job2 is now 
likely to forget (being by definition in a state of eternal bliss) – occasionally, Job3 may even 
voice some of Job1’s anxieties.
Job1 chooses substantive representation for the first forty years, descriptive or 
perhaps symbolic representation for the rest. The two (as personified by Job2 and Job3) are 
mutually exclusive. Job1’s reasoning is reasonable – we can understand it, we can identify 
with it, we can accept it. In other words: we can accept both types of representation as 
valid and consistent with our intuitions, yet the two are incompatible and lead to different 
results. Representation, then, even when modelled in a simple example as this, is a complex 
concept.
III. M A SS DE MOCR AC Y A N D R EPR ESEN TATION
Can we defend descriptive and substantive representation as instruments of 
equal and universal access to power for all? As we just saw, each separate conception of 
representation requires a separate defence. For each such defence we have three options.2 
Descriptive and substantive representation may be:
2] I assume that a fourth possibility, hypothetical value given a context, is included in the third.
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(1) Intrinsically valuable, i.e., ethically desirable ‘as such’, meaning that standing for or 
acting for are ‘absolute’ goods; 
(2) Categorically valuable, i.e., desirable against the background of mass democracy, 
but not, for instance, in a theocracy; and 
(3) Hypothetically valuable: desirable within representative democracy, but 
only under circumstances, only where it is ‘fitting’ (cf. Cupit 1996). I shall take 
representative democracy in a very broad sense as majority decision-making by 
elected representatives, with or without all possible extra’s like qualified majorities, 
deliberation, feedback loops, etc.
Is representation, first of all, intrinsically good, good as such, an absolute good? The 
fact that it takes three non-synonymous expressions to pose this question already indicates 
how complicated the question is, particularly because of the complexity of and confusion 
surrounding ‘intrinsic value.’ It may indicate value regardless of valuers, value regardless 
of being actively valued, value independent of its results or effects, and a long series of other 
things (cf. Wissenburg 1998, Van Hees 2000). An important aspect all these conceptions 
share, however, is that they describe a kind of final value. If x is intrinsically valuable in 
whatever sense, then there is no room for further argument - what makes x intrinsically 
valuable is by definition not something that is in turn valuable for a deeper reason.3 By 
implication, x’s intrinsic value must be beyond dispute - if x were a person, x would heave 
to be ‘of impeccable character.’ Representation, whether substantive or descriptive, is not 
an x of that kind: representation has a bad reputation.
Representation, if we may believe Plato (cf. Lock 1990), is falsification, cheating, 
insincerity; it is second-hand presence, pretending to be what one is not; it is acting - in 
the way an actor in a play does, or a child denying guilt after committing an transgression. 
One may disagree with Plato and the general tendency in philosophy to distrust all non-
philosophers’ attempts at reflecting reality. Yet his objection is a forceful one in that it 
reminds us of several ways in which representation may be undesirable, and by implication 
of several criteria that forms of representation have to meet before they can be qualified 
as desirable or even tolerable. Representation hides the truth: the representative’s own 
identity, for one - how can it be ‘intrinsically’ good to hide one thing and create the illusion 
of another? Representation plays the truth: it is not whatever is represented but interprets 
it - what is wrong with the represented that it needs representation; hence, what aims - or 
whose aims - does representation serve?
Perhaps we do not even need Plato to cast doubt on the impeccable moral 
character of representation. Ordinary language itself already indicates that we distrust 
representation: we can use the adjectives ‘good’ and ‘bad’ for it, qualifications that 
indicate that representation is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Imagine for instance 
3] Although there may be other reasons why x is valuable as well as reasons why that-which-makes-
x-intrinsically valuable is also valuable for other reasons - but the also is a contingent factor.
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a national-socialist bureaucrat who argues that the Jews hate themselves and that it is 
the wish of the Jews to be gassed. There is no account or interpretation of ‘acting for’ that 
would qualify this as ‘good representation,’ nor any according to which the mere fact that 
the Jews are represented here can be interpreted as good. Similar arguments can be made, 
mutatis mutandis, for descriptive representation. However good the performance, the act 
of representation, may be, it remains a representation. It will always have to be defended 
and measured against the real thing for which it stands (if that is possible at all, given 
Plato’s critique). In our case, this means that we cannot defend representation but in the 
context of the desire to warrant universal and equal access to power.
Moving on to the possible categorical value of representation, then, we should note 
that neither substantive nor descriptive representation is necessarily linked to mass 
democracy. Neither form of representation is a necessary or sufficient condition for equal 
and universal access to power, nor does either one necessarily serve equal and universal 
access to power, nor, finally, is equal and universal access to power always desirable. Hence, 
neither one can be a categorically desirable instrument of mass democracy.
Consider first substantive representation. There are ultimately two categories of 
reasons why substantive representation of all (and all equally) might be desirable: because 
it may contribute to good government, however defined, and because it may contribute to 
stable government. Let us start with the former argument. 
As the critics of democracy have maintained since Plato, democracy (or universal 
and equal substantive representation) and good government are not synonymous. A 
benevolent despot’s policies can be as good, a tyrant’s policies as bad as the democratic 
reflection of all substantive interests - and in Mill’s book, democracy might even do 
worse. If substantive representation and equal and universal access are connected by ties 
of necessity, then neither one is necessarily desirable. But they are not: equal and universal 
access to the tyrant or the benevolent despot, who may or may not desire to be a substantive 
representative of the people, is as imaginable as, say, representative democracy, and is just 
as much a necessary or sufficient condition of good government. Finally, substantive 
representation is not sufficient to guarantee equal and universal access. It can, after all, 
be interpreted as any reflection of ideas, from a necessarily selective representation of 
opinions and (best) interests that matter (i.e., that meet a certain standard of substantive 
quality) to ‘unreflective’ mirroring of actual preferences at any given moment in time. Not 
every one of these interpretations guarantees either equal access, or universal access, or 
both.
Representation as acting for might, secondly, contribute to stable government. It is 
not impossible that a defence in terms of stability will in the end boil down to a particular 
interpretation of good government: the survival of the body politic can be desirable because 
it contributes to further, substantive goals like the effectiveness of government, a stable 
basis of expectation, peace and security. What matters here, however, is the Machiavellian 
or realpolitische interpretation of stability, an equilibrium of powers, as a goal in itself. From 
this positive as opposed to normative perspective, substantive representation turns out 
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to have equally contingent ties to mass democracy. It can, for one, be used to represent 
weighted substantive interests, weighted relative to the power of political forces.
Mass democracy with its ideal of equal and universal access attaches the same 
weight to each individual, reflecting the popular notion in contract and bargaining 
theories of “roughly equal power” (cf. Rawls 1999a) in a potential war of all against all. The 
assumption here is that individuals can form coalitions to counter domination and that 
every possible coalition can be blocked by another coalition, hence that no coalition or 
individual can ever dominate in politics for more than a limited period of time. It is against 
this background that the rise of mass democracy can be explained as Realpolitik: once one 
coalition discovered the politically non-represented masses, managed to organize part of 
it and proved its power, the dynamic of mass organization ultimately made inclusion of 
every individual both expedient and inevitable.
However, the contractarian assumption of roughly equal power is incorrect, 
particularly in a world where borders are porous: it is for instance, and regardless of legal, 
political and economic obstacles, always easier for employers to move to another country 
than it is for the employed. Where the contractarian assumption is invalid, where some 
coalitions are less easy to block than others, the stability of the polity is better served by 
a system of substantive representation that reflects these differences in power - financial, 
technological, spiritual and other. It follows that substantive representation is not sufficient 
to guarantee, nor necessarily serves, equal and universal access to power. 
In conclusion then, substantive representation through mass democracy is 
not categorically desirable for three reasons: (1) substantive representation does not 
necessarily imply equal and universal access to power; (2) since equal and universal 
access through substantive representation does not necessarily contribute to good or 
stable government, it is not necessarily desirable; and (3) we can imagine alternatives to 
mass democracy that guarantee substantive representation. 
Similar lines of argument can be brought in against descriptive representation as 
categorically valuable. Descriptive representation can but need not guarantee equal 
access to power: if properly interpreted, it should include representation of differences in 
power. It - obviously - does not necessarily or sufficiently contribute to good government, 
unless good government is defined in purely formal terms as descriptive representation 
and nothing more – and that would amount to a petitio principii. Finally, for the same 
reasons that substantive representation fails to do so, descriptive representation need not 
contribute, and is insufficient, to guarantee stability. To see this, it is enough to imagine a 
divided society: Catholics in a Protestant nation, Muslims in a Christian or secularized 
nation, serious academics on a bible belt school board, women in an 1840s parliament, 
and so on: their presence may be an affront to the rest.
Thus, if substantive and descriptive representation by means of mass democracy are 
valuable things, they can only be so hypothetically, i.e. under the right circumstances or 
side-constraints, say, when no majority wants anything immoral, and when the will of the 
majority poses no threat to the survival of the polity. In the remainder of this section, I 
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shall try to give a more positive swing to this observation by formulating more definite 
criteria for the desirability of both forms of representation.
Starting with descriptive representation, I have already discussed a number of 
reasons why Pitkin’s conclusion that descriptive representation can easily be replaced 
by substantive representation is flawed. ‘Non-descriptive’ representatives may be 
physically unable to identify with the represented, it was argued, and their existence 
may create the impression that the non-represented are denied full membership of the 
polity. Moreover, as argued earlier in this section, if the two were interchangeable, the 
descriptive representative would by definition be a good substantive representative, and 
vice versa - which is also a good reason, by the way, for rejecting the counterhypothesis 
that substantive can be replaced by descriptive representation.
Yet in defence of Pitkin it must be said that these objections are less strong than 
they appear to be. The argument from experience is ultimately an argument in favour of 
a more adequate (substantive) representation of ideas and interests, while the argument 
from membership is actually an argument for the representation of a group’s legitimate 
claim to full membership, i.e. another idea suitable for substantive representation. The two 
arguments are neither arguments directly in favour of ‘standing for,’ nor directly against 
‘acting for’ - rather, they are arguments based on belief in the principal desirability of 
‘acting for,’ yet pointing to practical obstacles for the adequate or effective representation 
of ideas.
These two are only examples, of course, of normative arguments pointing to the 
practical restrictions of the theoretically desirable conception of representation as 
acting for. By the same token, we could introduce a long series of descriptively non- or 
underrepresented categories in, say, parliaments - non-academics, non-whites, Muslims, 
homosexuals, etc. The point however is that ‘representativeness’ as such, the degree to 
which representative bodies reflect the sociological composition of a polity, is utterly 
irrelevant from a theoretical perspective. The degree of reflection becomes interesting only 
when it becomes a political problem – when discomfort about perceived or experienced 
non-representation surfaces.
As arguments in favour of ‘standing for,’ all these objections derive their force from 
the practical shortcomings of substantive representation. They support the desirability 
of descriptive representation as contingent rather than hypothetical, i.e., as contingent 
on the failure of substantive representation – while making the prior assumption that 
substantive representation is valuable.
The only thing that can save descriptive representation is a normative argument 
straightforwardly defending it as hypothetically valuable. However, such an argument is 
conceptually impossible. Normative arguments necessarily refer to the value of things. 
Values are ideas; they are the substance to which the term ‘substantive’ in ‘substantive 
representation’ refers. If there is a positive argument for descriptive representation that 
does not require the prior failure of substantive representation, it will have to be realist 
argument, arguing for a kind of representation that properly reflects the composition of a 
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polity in terms other than their values as such – i.e., in terms of the popularity of specific 
values: the number of people supporting them, the intensity with which they do so, the 
significance they have for the smooth running of society. What this boils down to is a 
defence of descriptive representation as a means of reflecting of the perceived distribution 
of power in society. While that need not imply a cynical view of social cooperation – 
accounting for the actual distribution of power in the legitimization of policies may well 
be a morally valid concern – it cannot support descriptive representation in the context 
of mass democracy, since we expect that to imply equal and universal access to decision-
making, not as the perpetuation and affirmation of the insignificance of some citizens 
relative to others.
This then leaves us with only one possibility for an affirmation of mass democracy: 
because of the hypothetical desirability of substantive representation. So when is 
substantive representation through mass democracy desirable? We may, again, expect 
little help from political realism: there, the representation of ideas is only interesting if it 
contributes to stability. Whatever arguments in favour of substantive representation that 
goal may support will be arguments in favour of the representation of relevant voices and 
ideas only, i.e. the powerful. For the realist, the powerless are of no consequence; hence 
universal and equal access to political decision-making is redundant.
What remains are normative arguments. Textbook defences of (mass) democracy 
mention hosts of functions of democracy: adequate information on the preferences and 
desires of citizens and on alternative policies, the creation of legitimacy and legitimate 
authority, opportunities for accountability, and so on. However, functions and arguments 
are not the same. The functions just mentioned can be equally well performed by 
systems other than mass democracy - for again, the powerless are of no consequence and 
universal and equal access is redundant. What we need is a reason why the powerless, the 
‘insignificant,’ would matter, in particular, why their opinions and ideas matter. 
The significance criterion (“no person is insignificant”) reflects two philosophical 
traditions dating back to Stoicism: (inclusive) egalitarianism and (exclusive) 
anthropocentrism. Egalitarianism is the belief that, in relevant respects, humans are 
equal (which calls for a defence of equality) or, formulated more carefully, that since 
it is rational to treat like cases alike, it is artificial inequality that needs to be justified. 
Anthropocentrism argues that not everything is equal: there is a relevant and fundamental 
difference between human beings on the one hand, rocks, trees and animals on the other, 
a difference that makes humankind superior and turns the non-human world into means 
to human ends. Ever since John Stuart Mill, we refer to the combination of egalitarianism 
and anthropocentrism as ‘the plan of life,’ shorthand for self-consciousness, rationality, 
sense of future, sense of good and bad, sense of pleasure and pain, and other reasons for 
moral concern, the mix of which would be typical of humans only. 
In an enlightening discussion of the plan of life doctrine, Robert Nozick (1974) 
showed the combination of the two theories to be inconclusive in one important respect: 
if we humans believe ourselves to be morally superior to the rest of nature due to one 
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or more characteristic – characteristics that, since we share them, make us humans 
fundamentally equal – then an alien creature could claim moral superiority to us in virtue 
of a further, as yet unidentified, characteristic. And in fact, this – or an attitude very much 
like this – is precisely what kept philosophers from defending mass democracy until, in 
the course of the 20th Century, reality had long overtaken them. On one version of the 
anti-democratic argument, humans may be equal in their capacity for having a plan of 
life (if we may reinterpret e.g. classic liberalism in such Millian terms), yet they differ in 
their abilities to realize this potential. Hence, women, ruled as they are by dark passions, 
children, not yet grown to full rationality, and dependents, whose careers and lives are 
not of their own making, differ sufficiently from independent grown men to justify the 
political exclusion of the former to the advantage of the latter. The second, older version of 
anti-democracy argues that by nature, humans differ among themselves: some are born to 
rule, others to grow potatoes – in other words, a special natural capacity for politics exists 
that either cannot be changed from potential into actual in some people, or that simply 
lacks in them.4
The philosophical debate on (representation in) democracy, then, is inconclusive: 
although modern science has shown most obstacles to universal political participation to 
be repairable, and although political reality in Western liberal democracies has invalidated 
the old discussion, support for universal and equal access to political decision-making 
remains contingent on the absence of convincing arguments for ‘relevant’ intra-human 
inequality – and for admissible alternatives to equal and universal access. The least we can 
argue for, on the basis of the plan of life doctrine, is equality of respect, i.e., ‘one man, one 
voice’: a universal and equal right to speak for one’s interests, and an obligation on the side 
of the rulers to listen to that voice. To argue for equality in more respects – guaranteed 
influence, a real vote, an equal number of votes, etc – requires proof that one qualifies; to 
argue for more universality requires proof of equality. The plan of life doctrine, in brief, 
offers no specific support for mass democracy – it does not exclude it as (onto)logically 
impossible or ethically objectionable, but neither does it offer clear principles for the 
circumstances under which it would be possible or desirable. The doctrine is and remains, 
until proof to the contrary is formulated, equally compatible with the existence of a ruling 
class of Nozickian aliens from outer space or a benevolent aristocracy or enlightened 
despot.
The plan of life doctrine does, however, support the idea of substantive representation 
as such, more precisely, the idea that majoritarian representative decision-making is a 
context in which substantive representation is ‘fitting.’ Since what matters about humans, 
what differentiates them from the rest of creation, is their capacity for a plan of life, it is the 
4] It is interesting to note that both arguments for political inequality and the argument for funda-
mental human equality can all be traced back to one source: Socrates, who in his dialogue Meno (Plato 1978, 
82b ff.) proves that a slave, despite his lack of education, knows and understands Pythagoras’ theorem (support 
for rational equality and social obstructions to actual equality) – while in the Politeia (Plato 1974, 412b ff.) 
he argues that some are by nature more capable of realizing their potential for philosophy (rule) than others. 
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plans of life that need to be represented, more, and rather, than the individuals themselves. 
Note however that even here the victory for mass democracy is limited: if it is plans of life 
that matter, even those of the powerless, then their preferences as such do not matter since 
they do not necessarily express what is ‘really,’ on reflection and after due consideration, 
in the best interest of an individual’s plan of life. Obtaining adequate information on 
preferences may be a function of (mass) democracy, what makes it ethically admissible is 
not the reflection of those preferences but the system’s ability to on the one hand translate 
them into ‘real’ interests, and on the other shape real existing preferences to conform to 
these interests, to what individuals’ plans of life are really about. Note that despite the rather 
unfamiliar choice of words, this reflects some of the ideals of deliberative democracy as 
opposed to purely ‘formal’ democracy of the general election type, the former being more 
‘fitting’ to guarantee equal and universal access of ideas to the decision-making process.
I V. U N I V ER SA L A N D EQUA L ACCESS V ER SUS ‘LOSS OF POLIT Y’
There are grounds for not taking the ethical desirability of mass democracy for 
granted; as argued above, there are also quite practical reasons to fear for its viability. 
The appropriate context for mass democracy, the sovereign and relatively self-sufficient 
nation-state, if ever it existed, seems to evolve into a fuzzy context characterised by what 
I called ‘loss of polity.’ Political power becomes more fluid and uncontrollable, and – as 
I shall now argue - democracy does not appear to be an appropriate means of regaining 
control.
A direct consequence of ‘loss of polity’ is that even in formal terms, equal access to 
power for all ceases to exist, and that there no longer is universal access, either direct or 
indirect, to all the forums and political arenas where our future, our freedoms, our options 
are determined. In fact, in many places there no longer exists one unique clearly identifiable 
forum where the democratic formulation and ultimate assessment of policies takes place. 
Universality and equality are disappearing. Given that what matters is the representation 
of ideas, substantive representation, this is not necessarily a disaster – provided the new 
decision-making processes are representative in this latter sense.
Politics without a clear polity works flawlessly only where win-win-situations can 
be created, situations in which everyone, or at least enough actors with enough power, 
can profit from the same policy. A classic example is the environment: environmental 
policies are most successful where ecology and economy both profit, where e.g. cleaner 
production goes hand in hand with cheaper production. Unfortunately, like coal and 
oil, win-win-situations are a depletable resource. When they are gone, what remains are 
the real political conflicts in which interests are diametrically opposed and any solution 
will produce losers. This forces us to look at worst-case scenarios: what can happen in the 
worst case – what does it mean to have lost grip on power but more importantly, how to 
get a grip again? 
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If we ask ourselves if any of the possible solutions discussed so far offers a democratic 
grip on power – the answer must be negative. Equal and universal access to power requires 
either one forum or a clear and distinct hierarchy of forums where ‘the voice of the people’ 
can be expressed; without such clarity, access will again be distributed unequally and 
incompletely. None of the realistic solutions just sketched offers this kind of clarity.
As an alternative to institutional solutions, i.e., more and better forms of consultation, 
one might suggest that instead citizenship offers hope: it is, after all, not the formal and 
informal structures but how one uses them that determines whether individuals have a 
grip on power (cf. Wissenburg 2004, 2008). Ever since Alfred Marshall (cf. Marshall 1997; 
see also Benhabib 2002) it is customary to distinguish between three forms (political, 
economic and social) and two types of citizenship (liberal and republican). Ever since 
Dobson (2000, 2003), green political theorists have added ecological citizenship to the 
list of forms - and they will soon add post-cosmopolitan citizenship to the types. There is a 
substantial difference between the first three conceptions and the fourth.
Marshall’s citizens are constitutional citizens: they have rights against a government, 
whereas government has duties to protect but not interfere with the private sphere. 
‘Loss of polity’ is both good news and bad news for the Marshallian citizen, but the bad 
news completely outweighs the good news. On the one hand, individuals and (thereby 
for instance) environmental associations can profit from a divida et impera approach 
to ‘loss of polity.’ It may become easier to influence distinct political institutions in a 
fragmented political landscape by playing them out against each other or by threatening 
their (relatively more sensitive) power basis among a population. Yet the disadvantages 
outweigh the advantages. ‘Loss of polity’ gnaws at the borders between the public and 
the private, the foundations of Marshallian citizenship rights. It brings diffusion of not 
only powers but also of responsibilities - hence, there is a risk that no party can be singled 
out who is accountable to the public, or responsible for or even capable of listening to 
and answering citizens’ demands. Divida et impera also cuts both ways: parties involved 
in a game where no clearly dominant player exists can best reach (or approach) their 
objectives by creating minimal winning coalitions, coalitions that guarantee on the 
one hand sufficient power to effectuate the coalition’s demands, on the other sufficient 
stability to keep the coalition together. It is rational to economize as much as possible on 
the representation of citizens, hence to exclude as many as possible. In other words, ‘loss of 
polity’ may formally offer opportunities for citizens to raise their voice, be heard and have 
influence - but no incentives, only disincentives. Constitutional rights have a fairly limited 
role; it is the citizens themselves who would need to become more reactive, proactive and 
the very least defensive about their rights.
In green political thought, topics like deliberative, participatory and direct democracy, 
environmental awareness, individual responsibility, the green consumer, the role of NGOs 
and so on are ubiquitous. It is only fairly recently that Andrew Dobson combined these and 
similar topics under one heading (Dobson 2000, 2003): post-cosmopolitan citizenship. 
Post-cosmopolitan citizenship differs fundamentally from republican and Marshallian 
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citizenship by among other things including the private sphere, by rejecting territoriality 
as a basis of citizenship, and by regarding the obligations of citizens not as contractual 
but as ‘historical,’ i.e., determined by the capacity to influence others’ existence. Yet post-
cosmopolitan citizenship, apart from other disadvantages (cf. Wissenburg 2004), is at 
odds with moral pluralism and the liberal perspective on emancipation as defended here. 
One may question whether the virtues that post-cosmopolitanism would install in the 
minds and hearts of citizens are desirable, and whether it is desirable to prescribe any 
virtues at all, thus immunizing them against critique. This touches on a classical argument 
in favour of political pluralism: the real existence and irreducibility of a plurality of views 
on the good life (cf. Rawls 1993, 1999a). It also raises the question why citizens should 
do the ‘right’ thing only for the right reasons (i.e. out of the correct virtue), rather than 
to leave room for ‘deviant’ motives (cf. Wissenburg 2001). The argument applies to the 
value of citizenship in itself as well: one will not be the active and concerned citizen of the 
republican polity if one does not have to be one - that is, if it was not a necessary condition 
for the flourishing of community and (sic) individual. Like other Arendtian interpreters 
of Aristotle, republicans thereby tend to rank political activity as a more worthy, more 
valuable existence than other occupations - not just other “creative activities” (cf. Rawls 
1993) but also and foremost the work of the common man and woman, toiling to make a 
living from dawn to dusk. By definition, this makes the lives of all those who make society 
run less worthy: on any conception of the good life other than Arendt’s, an unwarranted 
attack on the dignity of humanity.
And yet all is not lost: there are still ways to satisfy the criterion of civilization. 
Substantive representation can still be served in other ways – as can other 20th Century 
ideals like deliberation, emancipation and protection of fundamental human rights. 
Substantive representation, after all, does not require equal and universal access to 
power for all individuals or all preferences. In the context of a politically plural world 
where equal and universal access to power have disappeared, we can no longer, at least 
technically, call whatever system of substantive representation that emerges a democracy 
– but neither was the medieval city with its guilds democratic, and yet it had the potential 
and sometimes even the practical courage to let each opinion be voiced, each interest be 
taken into consideration. The same applied to medieval Academia, for that matter. ‘Loss 
of polity’ by no means excludes substantive representation.
V. T WO FU T U R ES FOR SU BSTA N TI V E R EPR ESEN TATION
Let me briefly summarize the preceding argument. I have argued that mass democracy 
understood as equal and universal access to decision-making is a means to an end, the 
end being defined by the significance criterion. This criterion demands representation of 
all, but representation is a complex concept allowing multiple interpretations. Examining 
the reasons why the two most prominent conceptions of representation – substantive and 
descriptive – would be valuable, I claimed that we can only make a case for substantive 
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representation, only in the context of mass democracy, and only in the sense that mass 
democracy is one possible environment in which substantive representation may be 
possible. Descriptive representation is valuable only when substantive representation fails. 
Finally, I argued that the political basis of mass democracy is disappearing due to ‘loss of 
polity’, and that cures to the defects of a fading polity cannot, except with considerable 
imagination, be construed as new versions of mass democracy.
If we care about substantive representation, about representing the plans of life of 
all by definition significant individuals, then we will need to devise new representative 
institutions and new systems of representation. Among the side constraints for such 
institutions and systems are, apart from (1) a focus on acting for, (2) the exclusion of no 
one, and (3) recognition of the significance of every individual, two more controversial 
conditions: (4) they must not require the existence of state or polity (with incorporated 
ideas like territory, hierarchy) and (5) they must be operational wherever power is exerted. 
Above, I claimed that such institutions are not logically impossible; in this final section I 
want to support this argument by introducing two models that may be chosen in future 
attempts to develop post-mass democratic forms of substantive representation. Before I 
do this, however, I shall first discuss a worst case scenario.
In (political) realistic terms, we would not expect the rise of new forms of substantive 
representation, but instead a continuation of classic power politics in the new context of 
politics without clear polity. As Bernard Crick (2000) argued, politics without equal and 
universal access is not necessarily politics without any form of representation. It is rational 
for any ruling elite to consult experts, powerful supporters and powerful opponents – 
they can provide the information needed to ensure the physical and political viability of 
policies. Moreover, rational rulers will be open to a dialogue with these parties, both in 
the hope of gaining support and in the knowledge that the dialogue may result in change 
or even abandonment of the original plan. This consultation model is compatible with 
(read: not by far necessarily identical to) what John Rawls (1999b) calls a decent society: 
a basically just society that nevertheless lacks equal access to power. With its stress on 
serious consultation, it is also compatible with (but again not necessarily identical with) 
deliberative democracy. Since it remains rational in a context of ‘loss of polity’ to gather 
as much relevant information as possible and to be open to good suggestions, Crick’s 
consultation model will lose nothing of its relevance. Yet since it does not meet the 
civilization criterion, since it does not guarantee substantive representation – and that 
still demands in a way equal and in a way universal access to the ears of the rulers – it can 
hardly count as a post-state alternative to mass democracy.
A first way to meet this criterion and avoid the exclusiveness of political realism 
is to formalize processes of consultation and deliberation and extend participation to 
the powerless, i.e. to translate deliberative democracy to the new context of political 
fragmentation. In practical terms, this model would suggest more direct public control 
of international organizations (instead of control through representatives of states), more 
openness in the processes of preparation of, decision-making on and implementation 
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of policies, public debates and opportunities for consultation, responsiveness and 
accountability of global economic and civil actors, dialogues between NGOs and 
corporations, and so on. Obviously, a development in this direction will keep the classic 
problems of deliberative democracy theory unsolved, such as how to guarantee public 
interest and universal participation, how to ensure a quality of deliberative procedures 
sufficient to transform preferences into considered judgements, how to prevent domination 
by the rhetorically and financially superior, how to reconcile political consensus as regards 
wishes, means and goals with viable, effective and efficient policy (cf. Talshir 2004; Jun 
and Blühdorn 2006). Given ‘loss of polity,’ attempts at substantive representation through 
deliberation will also encounter a new problem: that of co-ordination. Nothing except 
a highly suspicious faith in an objective good guarantees that a deliberative consensus 
reached in one policy arena – say, Mediterranean trade – will concur with that reached in 
another – say, that of European environmental policy.
Unlike the deliberative strategy, the second path to substantive representation, that 
of consultative elitism, does not try to equate equal and universal access to power with 
equal and universal distribution of power. Consultative elitism is more economic in terms 
of formalities and institutional reforms: all it demands is that existing political institutions 
and those developing as a result of ‘loss of polity’ extend their consultation processes 
as much as is needed to include anyone potentially excluded. It sees the existence of 
potentially excluded groups and ideas as a political reality and can use its willingness to 
represent the actually and potentially powerless as an ethical recommendation. There 
is also a rational motive behind this noblesse oblige attitude – in other words, it is not 
totally non-self-serving: now that the 20th Century has unleashed the power of mass 
organization, it has become impossible to drive the spirit back into the bottle (cf. Ortega 
y Gasset 1932). Wilfully neglecting any group can be suicidal: it can induce them to 
organize (and in the times of internet, even a small organization can cause a lot of trouble) 
or drive them into the arms of opponents. The first politician or elite who manages to 
associate with an excluded but potentially powerful group usually has an advantage 
(albeit temporarily) over others, but also has to beware of second parties mobilizing other 
non-represented groups - hence, it usually pays for all rulers to include rather than exclude.
On this model consultation is not the standard operational procedure of political 
institutions; the initiative for consultation can also lie with the ruled and potentially 
excluded. This may give consultative elitism an interesting psychological and strategic 
advantage over the deliberative strategy: in line with Machiavelli’s views on opposition, it 
cherishes and to a degree fosters protest, rather than filtering and perhaps suppressing it 
by imposing the demands of reasonable and rational debate.
The two models presented here are archetypes, and are, as extrapolations of existing 
strategies (cf. for instance current debates on the democratization of the European Union, 
and Beck and Grande’s theses (2007) on the European Empire), inherently imperfect: 
they sketch options for the 21st Century, not existing realities or historical necessities. 
Our sympathies may lie with one or the other, but for reasons that go beyond the value 
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we attach to substantive representation and the civilization criterion. What matters, in the 
present context, is that both satisfy the latter criterion, that both offer viable alternatives to 
the brave new world of political realism on the one hand, and to the unsatisfactory side of 
mass democracy on the other.
What I want to suggest then is not that we develop a new perspective on citizenship 
under conditions of globalization and fragmentation, but instead that we look at another, 
in modern times often ignored, aspect of citizenship itself: the ruler as citizen. In a 
politically fragmented world, rulers can sometimes be as difficult to identify as they were 
in medieval times, if not more so - they may not even recognize themselves as such. The 
ruler’s responsibilities towards the ruled used to be one of the main topics of debate in 
political philosophy - as the existence of the Mirror of Princes genre testifies. In democratic 
times, however, it has become slightly odd to think of politicians, ministers, governors, 
high-ranking civil servants or administrators of regimes or supranational organizations 
as ‘rulers.’ Although the term is used quite frequently, its meaning nowadays is more 
what ‘minister’ used to describe: a servant, an executor of the general will. Any debate on 
the responsibilities of rulers is usually translated into a debate on different conceptions 
and degrees of representativeness and responsiveness. It is acknowledged that rulers 
have other criteria to meet - but with the ruler turned into an employee of the people, 
this is seen as a matter of professional ethics. In fact, in olden times as much as today, the 
princes of industry are usually not thought of as political actors even though they also 
determine who gets what, when and how. If they are seen as ministers at all, the people 
they administer are first and foremost the shareholders, although modern business ethics 
also acknowledges their responsibilities towards stakeholders like workers, environment 
and society as a whole - a point raised before the rise of capitalism as well (De Pizan 1994).
Yet the ruler still exists. No one in a position carrying political responsibility meets 
his or her supervisor, the people, more than once every four years or so; most never do 
but only meet the relatively (quite) independent delegates of the people, or the delegates’ 
delegates. People in power wield their power autonomously most of the time - even 
more under conditions of ‘loss of polity,’ conditions under which no clear structures of 
responsibility or control exist. The ruler is a citizen too, even if it is unclear of what he or 
she is a citizen. He or she is a very special citizen: one in whom powers have been vested 
no ordinary citizen has and most will never have. With power comes responsibility; the 
citizen as ruler has a far more extensive opportunity structure than, but is as morally 
accountable for his or her actions as, any other citizen. 
I have sketched a dark picture of the future of citizenship. If uninhibited, ‘loss of 
polity’ will result in a ‘realistic’ approach to the representation of ordinary citizens by 
citizen-rulers, that is, to the exclusion of the powerless and therefore of inconsequential 
interests - pace Beck and Grande (2007). Of the two alternatives to realism that I 
discussed, I indicated that institutionalizing new deliberative processes stands a far worse 
chance of success, and of drawing the realist rulers’ interest, than consultative elitism. 
This is admittedly a pessimistic scenario - and that is exactly what a worst-case scenario is 
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meant to be. It is also only part of the picture. One conclusion that I did not draw is that 
citizenship is not valuable - merely that it is difficult to defend in a new and fragmented 
context. Nor can we infer that even if citizenship in its present form(s) cannot be saved, 
that its core cannot survive either: representation, and behind that the idea ‘that no 
insignificant person was ever born.’
There are two things worse than a worst-case scenario. One is a truly and thoroughly 
pessimistic scenario offering no alternatives whatsoever. Although idealism itself is 
a prerequisite of survival, the other is any idealistic scenario that ignores that (some) 
humans are not angels. Prescriptive political theories that do not prepare for the worst - 
their refutation - can never help bring better futures closer.
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